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RESEARCH

Why some Portuguese professional football players engage in betting related match-fixing? A general strain theory perspective

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Abstract

This research uses the analytical potential of General Strain Theory in the study of criminal phenomena to understand why some Portuguese professional football players engage in betting related match-fixing based on a *quid pro quo*. The research follows a qualitative methodological strategy focused on the documental analysis of the *"Jogo Duplo"* court judgment - the only betting related match-fixing case tried in Portuguese court – and semi-structured interviews with former professional football players. The findings show that national footballers are subjected to three types of strains: *financial problems*; *lack of prospects*; and *reality shock*. These strains increase the vulnerability of these players, but they do not explain match-fixing on their own. It is their combination with catalysts of a relational (peer influence), organisational (organisational culture) and structural (opportunity structures) nature that produces this effect. This research expands the literature by showing that material deprivation (e.g. unpaid wages, low salaries) and the anticipated loss of status or lifestyle that some footballers experience in the latter stages of their careers are not the only strain factors. Footballers in the early or middle stages of their careers but with no prospects, victims of human trafficking, and players facing an abrupt career decline or stagnation may also resort to match-fixing as an illegitimate means of achieving positively valued goals, coping with the negative stimuli experienced, or achieving accomplishments in line with created expectations. This research also contributes to advancing the literature by producing micro-level knowledge, without overlooking the meso- and macro-level influences underlying the phenomenon.

Keywords General strain theory · Match-fixing · Strain · Peer influence · Organizational failures · Opportunity structures

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Introduction

Betting-related match-fixing (henceforth called match-fixing) represents a historical threat to sporting integrity (Huggins 2018). However, the emergence of a set of social transformations (internet, globalisation, new technologies (e.g. tablets, smartphones), and the consequent reconfiguration of the institutional design of the sports betting market (Moriconi and Almeida 2021; Tak 2018) have turned this phenomenon into a "global public policy issue" (Masters 2015: 111) and one of the 11 main organised crime activities in the EU (EUROPOL, 2021).

The launch of the "Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions" (Council of Europe 2014) is evidence of political concerns about the threat this phenomenon poses to public order and the rule of law (Serby 2015). Alarmed by the proliferation of match-fixing cases in a wide variety of sports (Carpenter 2012), international sports organisations (e.g. IOC, FIFA, ITF) have also implemented a "zero-tolerance policy" towards the phenomenon (Cima & Moriconi, 2022).

In reaction to the political and social relevance of the topic, there has been academic interest. Over the last two decades, social scientists have mobilised theories like rational choice theory (Forrest 2013; Forrest and Simmons 2003; Forrest et al. 2008), social network analysis theory (Costa 2018), moral development theory (Van der Hoeven et al. 2020), psychological decision-making theories (Barkoukis et al. 2020; O'Shea et al., 2021), social capital theory (Tzeng and Lee 2020), public secret theory (Numerato 2016), crime triangle theory (Marchetti et al. 2023), power theory (Cima 2024), institutionalist approaches (Tak 2018; Tak et al. 2018a, b) among other theories and perspectives (see Constand and Manoli 2022;) to understand the reasons why athletes engage in match-fixing practices.

Although the General Strain Theory (GST) is considered a reference in criminological literature (see, for example, Agnew, 1992; Agnew et al. 2009; Agnew and White 1992), its theoretical potential for understanding match-fixing remains unexplored. The current perspectives on strain and match-fixing explain the phenomenon through the anticipated loss of status or lifestyle that some footballers experience in the final stages of their careers (Hill 2015; Lastra et al. 2018), or through some kind of material deprivation, such as low wages or unpaid salaries (Cima 2025; FIFPro, 2012; Serby 2015; Spapens and Olfers 2015). These explanations, particularly those of Hill (2015), are in line with the classic conceptions of strain and crime (Merton 1938; Cohen 1955; Cloward and Ohlin 1960), conceptions that limit the explanation of the phenomenon to structural constraints that make it difficult to achieve positively valued goals (Agnew, 1992).

It is precisely at this level that GST can expand knowledge about strain and match-fixing, since this theory maintains that strains can also arise from the loss of positively valued stimuli, or due to the experience of negative stimuli. At the same time, GST maintains that it is not strains alone that explain crime. Rather, it is their articulation with relational, organisational and structural factors that produce this effect (see, for example, Agnew 1992, 1999, 2005, 2006, 2009). In this sense, this theory provides the necessary framework to mitigate the analytical reductionism of a theoretical field characterised by the predominance of rational choice theories and the disarticulation

between the micro-meso-macro levels of analysis (see Constandt & Manoli 2022; Kihl 2018; McNamee and Moriconi 2025; Numerato 2016).

In this context, this research aims to consolidate and expand knowledge about match-fixing by answering the question: *Why do some professional football players in Portugal engage in match-fixing practices based on a quid pro quo*? The research takes as its empirical reference the "Jogo Duplo" case (2015–2016), the first and only match-fixing case judged in Portuguese courts. As part of the "Jogo Duplo" case, 16 professional football players from União Desportiva Oliveirense and Clube Oriental de Lisboa were convicted (at first instance) of the offences of passive corruption and active corruption for manipulating results in the Portuguese 2nd division at the behest of a transnational match-fixing network led by three Malaysian individuals and assisted by three national corruptors - the "Luso-Malaysian" group (for a detailed description of the organisation of this criminal network see Cima 2024). The social dynamics underlying the "Jogo Duplo" process - centred on social exchange - is the reason why the work is restricted to match-fixing practices that involve a *quid pro quo*.

The article is organised into seven sections. The second section maps out the theoretical approaches to the topic and discusses their limitations. In the third section, the theoretical assumptions of GST are briefly outlined, explaining their relevance to this research. The fourth section presents and justifies the methodological strategy adopted. The article goes on to explain three types of strain that can increase the vulnerability to match-fixing approaches of professional footballers playing in Portugal. The sixth section presents the relational, organisational and structural factors that enhance the impact of the strains experienced by these players when they are enticed to get involved in match-fixing practices. The conclusions discuss the main results and their theoretical, political and sporting implications, present the limitations, and suggest future lines of research.

Strain and match-fixing: current approaches and limitations

An unavoidable question in the literature on match-fixing is to understand the reasons why sporting actors, namely professional football players, engage in match-fixing practices. In this respect, unlike other criminal phenomena (e.g. white-collar crime (Agnew et al. 2009), violent crime (Agnew 2004); property crime (Agnew 2009), or substance use (Lo et al. 2008), the relationship between strain and match-fixing has been scarcely theorised by social scientists.

Among the works that are an exception to the rule, it has been argued that professional footballers in the final stages of their careers may face strains related to the impossibility of continuing to earn above-average salaries and maintaining the status and lifestyle characteristic of the footballing profession. As a result, athletes may find in match-fixing an opportunity to maximise income in the final years of exercising their profession (Hill 2015; Lastra et al. 2018). Athletes may also be subjected to some form of material deprivation (e.g. wage arrears, low salaries) that increases their vulnerability to match-fixing approaches (Cima 2025; FIFPro, 2012). This is particularly alarming in greedy athletes (Manoli and Antonopoulos 2015), when ath-

letes participate in competitions with lower visibility and scrutiny; when the moral cost associated with match-fixing is low (Forrest 2013), or when they are subjected to threats or coercion attempts (Carpenter 2012).

Despite their merits, the current explanations are limited as they do not explore the full theoretical potential of the relationship between strains and match-fixing. For example, Hill (2015) established an association between advanced age and match-fixing by finding that 51 per cent of players convicted of engaging in match-fixing practices in the Malaysian and Singaporean football leagues were over the age of 29 at the time of the incident. However, the author did not provide any explanation for the proportion of convicted players who were in the early or middle stages of their careers. This is a transversal gap in the literature on the topic.

The current explanations also fail to detail the main characteristics of the strains that lead to match-fixing. As noted by Agnew (2010), the characteristics of strains vary from situation to situation, whereby "a type of strain such as material deprivation may differ in its magnitude (e.g. degree, duration, centrality, pervasiveness), perceived injustice and source" (ibid.: 134). Such variations influence to a greater or lesser degree the propensity for the individual to engage in criminal behaviour as a way of coping with the strains experienced.

Finally, although recent research into human trafficking (Esson 2015; Nkang 2024) has expanded the range of negative experiences that can put footballers under stress, the relationship between match-fixing and this and other types of criminal victimisation also remains to be explored.

Furthermore, the lack of complementarity between the micro, meso and macro levels represents a central limitation of the literature (see Cima 2023; Kihl 2018; McNamee and Moriconi 2025). Most of the literature is based on rational choice theories. According to this perspective, match-fixing results from a process of individual weighting, in which the expected costs (probability of detection; consequences of detection (fine, loss of salary/performance bonus, loss of reputation, prison sentence, associated moral costs) are weighted against the expected benefits (bribe: money, promise of a new labour contract) (Hill 2009, 2010; Forrest 2013; Forrest and Simmons 2003).

However, even though any decision ultimately presupposes a rational calculation, it does not take place in a social vacuum. Social norms and the social environment also play a determining role in athletes' involvement in match-fixing practices (Barkoukis et al. 2020). Analysing the moral decision-making processes underlying participation in match-fixing, der Hoeven et al. (2020) found that athletes (among other sports actors) are aware of the immorality of this problem and disapprove of its manifestation. However, when faced with certain moral challenges like a bribery versus unpaid/low wages, peer pressure, or powerful entities (O'Shea et al., 2021), they tend to activate moral disengagement mechanisms and eventually succumb to the interests of the manipulators (der Hoeven et al., 2024).

Match-fixing also occurs in specific institutional contexts that normatively and culturally influence the behaviour of the sports actors within them (Tak 2018; Tak et al. 2018a, b). Specifically, the reconfiguration of the institutional design of sports betting has created an "artificial market" in which playing to lose can be more advantageous than playing to win (Tak 2018: 2). At the same time, the allegations of fraud

and corruption that have fallen on sports organisations such as FIFA and UEFA (Geeraert 2018; Jennings 2006), have removed legitimacy from the institutional discourse promoted by sports leaders (Tak 2018; Tak et al. 2018a), which helps to explain the ineffectiveness of the countermeasures adopted to combat the phenomenon (see Cima & Moriconi, 2022, 2023).

Finally, the involvement of athletes in match-fixing practices can also be explained by the external social pressures promoted by the new sports betting model (Forrest et al. 2008; Gorse & Chadwick, 2010; Hill 2010). At this level, the greater financial flow generated by betting markets, the reduction in the bettor's transaction costs (lower tax burden), the emergence of new types of betting (live betting, spot betting, betting exchange), the lack of scrutiny in some countries heavily dependent on gambling revenues, and the inability to control the illegal market are seen as the main structural factors that create logical bases for the constitution and actions of criminal groups dedicated to this type of practice (Forrest et al. 2008; Gorse & Chadwick, 2010; Moriconi and Almeida 2021). Failures in sports governance creating precariousness in the environment (Cima 2025; Marchetti et al. 2021), as well as the inadequacy of existing legal structures to deal with the phenomenon (Aquilina and Chetcuti 2013; Moriconi and Almeida 2019, 2021; Serby 2015) are additional factors that favour the emergence and actions of this type of criminal group.

Although the development of various theoretical perspectives has mitigated analytical reductionism, the literature still lacks theories that link the different levels of analysis into a coherent theoretical explanation (see McNamee and Moriconi 2025). As will be seen in the next section, this is one of the main theoretical contributions that GST offers to the literature on match-fixing.

Classic perspectives on strain theory and crime argue that an individual's nonconformist behaviour arises as a response to strains resulting from the ''disintegration'' between cultural structure (cultural goals versus institutional norms) and social structure (structural constraints and possibilities), whether these are related to financial success (Merton 1938), status or the adoption of a particular lifestyle (Cohen 1955; Cloward and Ohlin 1960).

The kind of strain portrayed by classical conceptions stems from actual or anticipated failure to achieve positively valued goals. However, it is questionable whether all personal goals are idealised by the cultural system (Agnew, 1992). Individual ambitions can also stem from personal experiences or comparison with reference groups (Cohen 1965). In such cases, strain is generated by the disjunction between expectations - whether formulated by empirical experience or modelled by reference groups - and actual achievements. In addition, individual goals may not be centred on specific results, but rather on the distributive justice of those results (Agnew, 1992). Strains can also result from the deprivation of positively valued stimuli. This type of strain can arise from a wide range of situations, such as the deprivation of money (e.g. unpaid wages, unemployment). Finally, strains can be a consequence of the presentation of negatively valued stimuli (ibid.). Experiencing negative stimuli can involve various types of criminal victimisation, stressful events, among other harmful behaviours that can directly or indirectly cause physical, emotional, psychological or financial damage to the victim (Agnew and White 1992).

A brief overview of general strain theory These findings motivated Agnew (see, for example, 1992; 2006; 2009) to develop GST. The author expanded the literature on strain and crime by proposing a typology of strains made up of three ideal types (cumulative of each other): (1) "strain as the actual or anticipated failure to achieve positively valued goals"; (2) "strain as the actual or anticipated removal of positively valued stimuli"; and (3) "strain as the actual or anticipated presentation of negatively valued stimuli" (Agnew, 1992: 47). Ideal type 1 is subdivided into three strain subtypes: (1.1) "strain as the disjunction between aspirations and expectations/actual achievement"; (1.2) "strain as the disjunction between expectations and actual achievement"; and (1.3) "strain as the disjunction between just/fair outcomes and actual outcomes" (ibid.: 51–53).

GST focuses on the strains that result from the negative relationships that individuals establish with other people. This theory argues that strain increases the likelihood of individuals facing negative emotional states (depression, fear, anger, etc.), which in turn are likely to increase their vulnerability to adopting criminal behaviours as a way of coping (Agnew, 1992). From this perspective, footballers can find in match-fixing an illicit alternative for achieving positively valued goals (e.g. status), recovering or maintaining positive stimuli that was effectively or previously removed (e.g. standard of living associated with the footballing profession), or escaping negative stimuli (e.g. human trafficking situations).

Although it is an individualistic theory, GST has the merit of not neglecting the role of intermediate social forces (meso) and structural forces (macro) in the deviant behaviours of individuals (Agnew, 1992). Indeed, strains can produce different levels of vulnerability in the people who experience them (Agnew 2009), but they do not explain crime on their own. It is their combination with relational, organisational and structural catalysts that influences the subjective interpretations and emotional reactions of individuals to these strains, which can in turn expand the opportunities or increase the costs associated with crime (Agnew 2010). As already mentioned, this is an advantage given the need for dynamic (micro-meso-macro) theoretical explanations in this field.

Methodology

This research followed a qualitative methodological approach. Qualitative research has been particularly used to understand why individuals adopt deviant behaviours (see, for example, Adler 1985; Becker, 2009 [1963]; Whyte 1993 [1943]). Qualitative research makes it possible to understand social phenomena in depth, starting from the perceptions, behaviours and meanings of the social group under study (Denzin and Lincoln 2018). This is a clear advantage in the study of opaque phenomena such as match-fixing, in the sense that it favours serendipity and abductive reasoning, enabling the emergence of properties and analytical categories not previously considered by the literature (Charmaz 2006).

Data collection

Data collection was based on methodological triangulation between two methods: documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews. This option aimed to broaden knowledge about the phenomenon under analysis, increase the reliability of the data and reduce researcher bias (Denzin 2017 [1970]). A substantial part of the documentary analysis focused on the judgment of the ''Jogo Duplo'' case (Judgement of the Lisbon Central Criminal Court (TCCL) of 28 February 2020, case 819/16.0JFLSB.L1). Access to the "*Jogo Duplo"* (2015–2016) court judgment case was obtained following a formal request. This is the judicial document in which the appealable decision in the ''Jogo Duplo'' case was handed down by the court of first instance in which this legal case was judged. The analysis of the ''Jogo Duplo'' case centred on the prosecution narrative handed down by the Portuguese Public Prosecutor's Office, duly supported by evidence such as wiretaps and text messages[1,2]. Analysing this primary data made it possible to identify the social dynamics (e.g. persuasion strategies, shared narratives) underlying match-fixing practices in Portuguese professional football. This proved decisive in understanding the extent to which the relational influences of peers influenced the criminal behaviour of groomed footballers. To protect the identity of the defendants - as the case is currently under appeal - pseudonyms have been used (e.g. corrupt 1–10 (C1-10); manipulated player 1–10 (MP1-10).

In addition, a television report entitled ''Public Enemy No. 1'' - broadcast on 21 October 2019 on channel 11 (channel of the Portuguese Football Federation (FPF)) - was analysed. In particular, the testimony of a professional football player (PFP1) approached to fix results by the "Luso-Malaysian" group allowed us to expand on the knowledge gained from analysing the ''Jogo Duplo'' case. The documentary analysis also extended to a wide range of documents (e.g. international conventions, national legislation, online newspapers, archive data from institutional websites) which helped to contextualise and validate the testimonies given, and to support the theoretical assertions.

Although analysing court documents is relevant to criminological research due to its credibility, there are several issues underlying the commission of a crime, such as its social causes, cultural influences and structural possibilities and constraints that cannot be understood using this type of source alone. To obtain this information, semi-structured interviews were carried out with seven players (PP1-PP7) and seven former professional footballers (Ex-PP1-Ex-PP7) who contributed as privileged informants.

Access to these participants was gained through the researcher's social circle and the snowball strategy. The interviews were conducted using an interview script built around one main topic: social conditions. The interviewees were asked about the circumstances in which footballers work in Portugal to understand what kind of strains this social group is subject to, what the social causes of these strains are, and what

[1] The 'Jogo Duplo' case has not yet reached a final judgement, so the allegations of the Public Prosecutor's Office on which this work is based should be understood as such.

[2] Some of this material (wiretaps and text messages) was published in Cima (2024) and was reused to support new theoretical claims.

relational, organisational and structural factors can exacerbate their impact on footballers' manipulative behaviour. Some interviewees revealed that they knew the situations of some of the footballers involved in the "Jogo Duplo" process, which proved to be an additional advantage. The interviews followed a logic of progressive approximation to the theoretical construction, which meant re-arranging the questions in the script according to the properties and categories that emerged (Charmaz 2006). The interviews lasted between 1 hour and 1 hour and 45 minutes. The interviews were conducted in Portuguese, under anonymity, recorded with the participants' authorisations and transcribed as soon as possible. The translation of the testimonies was reviewed by an English proofreader.

Data analysis

The data analysis followed two analytical stages: initial coding and focused coding (Charmaz 2006). First, the interviews were coded line by line. This technique is used in the early stages of research to analyse "detailed data on fundamental empirical problems and processes" (Charmaz 2006: 50). The aim was to generate a brainstorm and open as many theoretical fronts as possible for further exploration. The "*Jogo Duplo"* (2015–2016) court judgment was coded incident by incident. The initial coding culminated in the drawing up of initial or provisional codes. Focused coding raised the conceptual level of the analysis. Codes without analytical relevance were abandoned, while those with greater analytical scope were elevated or grouped into provisional categories. Focussed coding continued with the verification of provisional categories, the development and refinement of definitive categories (financial problems, lack of prospects, and reality shock), the relationship between categories, and finally, theoretical integration.

Why some professional Portuguese football players engage in match-fixing?

According to data, match-fixing practices in Portuguese professional football can be understood through three main strains: (a) financial problems; (b) lack of prospects; and (c) reality shock.

Financial problems

The *financial problems* is a type 2 strain, i.e. it involves the actual or anticipated removal of positively valued stimuli. Although the financial problems of footballers playing in Portugal may stem from conspicuous consumption (Law et al. 2021), gambling addiction (Moriconi and Cima 2020b), or labour exploitation (Cima 2025), the evidence provided by the "Jogo Duplo" ruling suggests that at this level, the non-payment of wages is the main risk factor for match-fixing.

Non-payment of wages consists of the undue and temporary deprivation of the right to receive wages, among other financial benefits to which footballers are entitled (e.g. sporting performance bonuses). The resulting strain will be more impactful

the longer and more frequently the salary is not paid, especially compared to the impact it has on the players' savings.

Non-payment of wages fertilises the ground for match-fixing practices, in the sense that it generates strains that are "high in magnitude". The magnitude of a strain refers to the degree to which it is negatively evaluated and the harmful impact it has on the individual (Agnew, 1992). In the case of the "Jogo Duplo" case, every Oliveirense player accused of collaborating with the "Luso-Malaysian" group (MP7-MP10) experienced wage arrears. The failure to fulfil contractual conditions put several players in an extremely vulnerable situation and some of them were deprived of the necessities, such as "not having enough money to eat or pay for a house" (Ex-PP5). The situation worsened to such an extent that the Oliveirense players threatened to strike training sessions and not turn up on match days[3].

In addition, when blamed on third parties, the strains caused by financial problems are likely to generate a feeling of injustice in the gambler. Strains perceived as unfair "can foster the belief that crime is desirable, justifiable or excusable" (ibid.: 171). In other words, a footballer who is temporarily or permanently deprived of the right to receive all or part of his salary or other types of employment rights may rationalise match-fixing as a justifiable and excusable alternative to getting back a material resource (money) illegitimately denied by his employer. As PP1's testimony suggests, one of the main persuasion strategies used by the "Luso-Malaysian" group consisted precisely of rationalising match-fixing as an alternative solution to the financial problems of the players being recruited.

He called me and said:

- "Look, I have a businessman who wants to speak to you". I arrived and when I greeted him.

there was the amount in my hand.

- "Do you want this money? It's already yours." And I replied:

- "That easy?"

"I was not supposed to talk to you, but I know you […] have not been paid for three months". (PP1 in "Public Enemy No. 1").

Finally, financial problems resulting from wage defaults can create pressures or incentives for crime. As Agnew (2009) points out, the urgent need for money can easily be solved by a series of crimes. In this respect, the analysis of the "Jogo Duplo" case and the testimony of a former locker room colleague of MP10 (Ex-PP3), respectively, suggest that MP1 and MP10 may have found in the association with the

[3] Jornal de Negócios (2016) "Jogadores recebiam 3.500 euros para viciar resultados na II Liga" (*online*). Available in: https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/economia/justica/detalhe/jogadores_recebiam_3500_euros_para_viciar_resultados_na_ii_liga___jn.

"Luso-Malaysian" group an (illicit) alternative to solve family dramas. While MP10 used the advance on the bribe to buy a prosthesis for his brother, MP1 transferred part of the bribe (allegedly) received to his country of origin (Brazil) to help his wife and daughter with their daily expenses (Ex-PP3).

(*Phone conversation between C1 and C2*)

[…] he called me to say that he was going to sort it out and to say that [MP10] used the money for a prosthesis for his brother and that he was there playing the whole game on the floor, man, and that's true, [MP7] told me (C1).

Imagine having a family in Brazil, they do not pay you for 10 months, they do not pay you and then you go to the [name of club] […] the whole place was struggling to pay, and I do not know what, and suddenly you're offered 10 or 20 or 30 thousand euros. You put yourself in the shoes of someone who has a family to support (Ex-PP3).

Lack of prospects

The relationship between strains and crime can also be explained by anticipated experiences (Agnew, 2002). For example, match-fixing practices can be motivated by strains which players highly expect they will have to face soon. Unlike Hill (2015), who used classical conceptions of strain theory to analyse this issue, we believe that the *lack of prospects* that professional players at the end of their careers tend to face is better suited to a type 2 strain, as it results from the "anticipated removal" of positively valued stimuli.

The lack of prospects is a strain that varies in degree according to the positive value placed on the profession, status and quality of life. In other words, the strain will be greater in situations where players perceive that they won't be able to find the gratification, status or standard of living they get as footballers in another professional activity.

In Portugal, most professional footballers do not have the academic qualifications or the professional skills to be absorbed by the labour market. In 2019, out of 424 players playing in the top three divisions of men's football and the top division of women's football, only 33.3 per cent had completed secondary school and only 8.2 per cent went on to higher education[4]. The reality of the players involved in the "Jogo Duplo" process is enlightening in this respect. Among the range of players at the end of their careers (MP2 (31 years old), MP3 (29 years old), MP4 (30 years old), MP7 (38 years old), only MP4 attended higher education. Furthermore, MP5 (22 years old) and MP9 (22 years old) didn't even finish secondary school. The expectation that exclusive dedication to football will translate into sporting, financial or status success, as well as the demands of the profession itself, help explain this decision. For example, MP5 abandoned his studies after completing the 11th grade, "due to having

[4] Jornal de Notícias (2019) "Futebolistas poupam muito até nos estudos" (*online*). Available in: https://www.jn.pt/desporto/futebolistas-poupam-muito-ate-nos-estudos--11456558.html.

started as an international player in the under-20 category" (Judgement of the TCCL of 28 February 2020, case 819/16.0JFLSB.L1: 111).

Against this background, it could be very difficult for football players to have a post-football career that guarantees salaries comparable to those in Portuguese professional football. For example, in the 23–24 season, the minimum wage established for the 1 st League was €2,280 gross per month. In contrast, in 2024 the average gross monthly salary in Portugal was €1,911[5]. Thus, when faced with the impossibility of continuing to exercise a pleasurable profession, which is associated with a specific status and quality of life, it is inevitable that professional footballers, especially those who are less academically qualified, will experience this kind of strain.

In consequence, match-fixing can be seen as an illegitimate way for footballers to deal with the strain generated by the approaching end of their careers. However, contrary to what Hill (2015) suggests, the relationship between this type of strain and match-fixing practices does not seem to be the result of a rational choice aimed at maximising profits in Portugal. Instead, the data suggests that this relationship stems from an attempt to minimise losses resulting from situations of non-compliance with salaries or the investment of time (exclusive dedication) made in a career which turned out to be more modest than expected. The testimonies of PP3 and Ex-PP5 point in this direction.

The older [player] is already at a stage in his career where – "I'm not going to earn anything from this, I'm here…" That's what I was saying, if a person has unpaid wages, gets paid very little, has a family, with 10,000 euros what is he going to say? - "Look, you're going to have to take a penalty kick […]" I think it's a bit like that (PP3).

[…] it's not the young players who are arriving who are the easiest to sell or offer, not least because they do not know the environment, they do not know the mechanisms, they do not know the people […] it's the older players who have been here for a long time, they have nothing to lose, and they need the money (Ex-PP5).

Furthermore "Jogo Duplo" demonstrates that the strain resulting from a lack of prospects is not limited to players at the end of their careers. Players in the early/mid stages of their careers, who are at the end of their contracts and have little or no professional prospects, can experience similar strains. Footballers work in a short-lived profession (lasting between 10 and 15 years) characterised by high job mobility. According to the FIFPro study (2016), "Global Employment Report: Working conditions in professional football", the average length of footballers' contracts is less than two years. In other words, it is common for lesser-known footballers to regularly find themselves in an indefinite professional situation just a few months before the end of their contract. The strain that arises from this scenario of professional uncertainty increases as the prospects of receiving offers that at least maintain the existing labour conditions (e.g., salary, competitive level) diminish. For those who experience this kind of strain, a manipulative offer with the promise of a good labour contract can "mess with the player's head" (Ex-PP4). According to Ex-PP4, the promise of

[5] Observador (2024) "Portugal com 22.933 euros ocupa 18.º lugar da UE no salário médio anual ajustado" (online). Available in: https://observador.pt/2024/11/07/portugal-com-22-933-euros-ocupa-18-o-lugar-da-ue-no-salario-medio-anual-ajustado/.

employment contracts in exchange for match-fixing is a "common practice" in Portuguese professional football, and it feeds off the uncertainty and labour instability that characterise this environment. Analysis of the "Jogo Duplo" case confirms that this is a strategy used by some corruptors, particularly those who work as player agents.

> *Match-fixing based on promises of contracts is very common […] If you analyse the last matches of the season of the teams that are fighting for promotion, you'll see that there are players from opposing teams who move to those teams the following season […] Then it depends on the salary and the length of the contract. A good contract can change a player's life (Ex-PP4).*
>
> *(Message exchange between C4 and one of the enticed players).*
>
> *1250, one year contract, 0–1. 2,500, two-year contract, 3−1 or 3−0. Good luck (C4).*

Reality shock

Reality shock incorporates strains of type 1 (subtype 1.1, 1.2) and type 3.

Firstly, reality shock can arise from the disjunction between social conditions promised and social conditions found (subtype 1.2). This happens when ill-intentioned businessmen promise a bright future in European football to young people from underdeveloped countries, but the reality they face does not match the expectations created (Tsuma 2016).

Moreover, players who are victims of human trafficking are subjected to another type of strain that results from the experience of negatively valued stimuli (type 3). In recent years, dozens of foreign players who sought their fortune in Portuguese professional football have ended up "abandoned to their fate" due to a lack of placements (SJPF, 2020: 12). Many of these cases were flagged by the Foreigners and Borders Service as potential human trafficking crimes[6].

The case of MP10, an African player involved in the "Jogo Duplo" case, exemplifies how this kind of reality shock can be impactful. MP10 was persuaded by a businessman to travel to Portugal, with the promise of joining one of Portugal's top clubs. However, after a brief, unsuccessful stint at that club, he ended up in a district championship team in extremely vulnerable conditions, "with no initial housing, staying overnight for […] months in the club where he played, outside, under the stands" (Judgement of the TCCL of 28 February 2020, case 819/16.0JFLSB.L1: 129).

These strains occur in the context of secondary socialisation, but its effects can have a greater repercussion when there has been previous primary socialisation along the same lines. In fact, as most footballers come from disadvantaged social classes and find football one of the few opportunities for social mobility, it is common for families from this social stratum to encourage young people to "transcend their

[6] Moleiro (2022). *Há 40 clubes de futebol investigados por tráfico humano e imigração ilegal*. Expresso. https://expresso.pt/sociedade/2022-10-18-Ha-40-clubes-de-futebol-investigados-por-trafico-humano-e-imigracao-ilegal-34589df8.

objective conditions" through football (McGillivray et al. 2005: 102). This disjunction between cultural aspirations and achievements can place footballers under strain (subtype 1.1). When experienced persistently, it may lead them to engage in match-fixing as a way of achieving positively valued goals (status, financial success) by alternative means or to escape negative stimuli experienced. The experience of financial problems and the resulting social pressures from family members can increase the likelihood of the strain being resolved through match-fixing practices. According to the testimony of Ex-PP1, this was the case with MP1, one of the two foreign players convicted in the "Jogo Duplo" case.

Imagine, for example, a Brazilian player who comes to Portugal with the aim of finding a better quality of life, to fulfil a dream, and arrives at a club where all he has are papers from the landlord to evict him because he doesn't pay the rent, his wife talking to him and questioning why he's come here, because they're living in worse conditions than they were in Brazil, and then someone comes along and says – "look, you concede a penalty and you get 5,000 euros" (Ex-PP1).

The shock of reality can also be due to an abrupt drop in career. This type of stress (subtype 1.2) can occur when footballers who have spent a substantial part of their career at youth level or have signed professional contracts with the main national clubs (S.L. Benfica, F.C. Porto, Sporting C.P.), see their career follow a downward spiral, translated into consecutive relegation(s).

Having the opportunity to join the training ranks of the main national club's means being one of the best young footballers in the country. For the youngsters with the greatest potential, signing a professional contract can mean a monthly salary above the national average. In addition, there are the sometimes-excessive expectations of family members, friends, coaches and managers. The experience of representing the national youth teams acts as an additional stimulus for the player and his social circle to envisage a successful future in this professional activity. However, when faced with the end of their contract, the general lack of interest from medium-sized clubs in signing them, the need to continue their career in teams in secondary divisions (professional or amateur), and the consequent inability to meet the expectations set or to maintain the achievements made so far (professional success, financial success, status, lifestyle), footballers can be confronted with this kind of strain.

In fact, four players (MP3, MP4, MP5, MP9) convicted in the "Jogo Duplo" case joined teams in secondary divisions after being dismissed from top national clubs. This does not, by itself, explain their involvement in match-fixing practices. However, the following testimonies illustrate how unpreparedness for readjusting expectations regarding predefined goals or adapting to new working conditions and social environment could place footballers under strain, thereby increasing their vulnerability to match-fixing approaches.

The players who play in lower divisions, many of them were trained at big clubs and grew up with the expectation of a successful career […] Many are still living the dream. They still believe that football is what they experienced at youth level. But football isn't like that […] Because everything is different. No one puts the equipment on for you, you must go and get it. […] the kid who comes in full of Benfica or Porto tics, walks into the changing room, they've got him in the corner in 10 min. They are not prepared for that (Ex-PP5).

He worked with me at [name of club] a few years ago. I can tell you about his story, so you can understand a bit about his motivation for doing it [manipulating results]. At the time, when he was at [name of club], he was a 19, 20-year-old kid, an international, he'd done all his training at [name of a top national club], with some pressure and some expectations of reaching a high level. And suddenly he sees his career passing him by and not living up to the status he had three, four years earlier, when he was an under-19 international. Careers pass; opportunities also pass (Ex-PP1).

Finally, reality shock can result from career stagnation. Career stagnation occurs when a player remains at the same level for a considerable period, to the point of losing any expectation of professional progression. This state does not generate strain. However, when it occurs at a later stage than the abrupt career decline, or when set against unreasonable expectations, it can culminate in the decision to engage in match-fixing. This is also the perception of Ex-PP5.

This is also the division of disappointment [3rd division]. You stay for a year, two years, three years until you realise that you're not going anywhere. You might as well try to make some money [by fixing matches]. And we feel that. A player who stays in this division for a long time is usually a player who has discredited himself […] He has discredited himself. He's become disillusioned. It's not easy to chase this dream (Ex-PP5).

Career stagnation differs from a lack of prospects in the sense that in this state of professional crystallisation, the player is no longer concerned about the future of his football career and, as a result, the relative value attributed to his sporting performance decreases. In this way, the player may be more accepting of a deliberate reduction in sporting performance in exchange for undue material advantages, considering the lower residual value attributed to sporting performance in this type of circumstance. In fact, all the players involved in the ''Jogo Duplo'' case (MP1-MP10) were playing in the national second tier in teams that were mathematically relegated at the time of the events. In fact, according to judgment of the ''Jogo Duplo'' case, some of the players who initially committed themselves to the Luso-Malaysian group's scheme went back on their word when they realised that their team still had a chance of avoiding relegation. This illustrates the players' greater propensity to fix matches in the absence of sporting objectives.

(Phone conversation between C1 and C2).

- [Team name] was going to do it [fix matches] this week and does not do it anymore and is that ok? (C2). 104.

- No […] because they still need at least one point against [team name] (C1).

Table 1 compiles the strains that increase footballers' susceptibility to match-fixing approaches in Portugal, as well as the professional footballers most likely to experience them.

Table 1 – Strains that increase footballers' susceptibility to match-fixing approaches in Portugal

Description	Type	Susceptible players
Financial problems	Effective and temporary deprivation of salary (type 2)	All players (stronger among low-paid players nearing career end)
Lack of prospects	Anticipated loss of salary and/or lifestyle (type 2)	Players nearing the end of their careers
		Players at early or intermediate career stages, approaching contract expiration and lacking new offers
Reality shock	Disjunction between cultural aspirations and athletic achievements (subtype 1.1)	Migrant players coming from less developed countries
	Discrepancy between promised and encountered social conditions (subtype 1.2)	
	Criminal victimization – human trafficking (type 3)	
	Gap between expectations and sporting achievements (subtype 1.2)	Players experiencing a sudden career drop
		Players experiencing career stagnation

Factors that reinforce the relationship between strain and match-fixing

Although strains increase footballers' susceptibility to match-fixing approaches, they alone do not explain their criminal behaviour. This section seeks to understand the extent to which a set of relational (*peer influence*), organisational (*organisational culture*) and structural (*opportunity structures*) factors influence footballers' propensity to deal with them by resorting to illicit behaviour.

Peer influence

Social connections – as a relational dimension of social capital - play an important role in match-fixing dynamics (Cima 2024; Tzeng and Lee 2020). At this level, one of the most important indicators is identity, understood as the process of recognising and identifying an individual in relation to others or groups (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). Merton (1968: 288) postulated the concept of "reference group" to understand how individuals take the values or standards of others as a frame of reference. The "Jogo Duplo" illustrates how a comparative reference group can model the footballer's decision to engage in match-fixing, with corruptors using the prior acceptance of teammates to recruit indecisive players into the "Luso-Malaysian" illicit scheme.

- "We have already spoken to your entire team, and they accepted.

"Man, if that is the case, if everyone has already accepted it, it's okay." (PFP1 in "Public Enemy No. 1").

Another issue concerns peer pressure on individuals' criminal behaviour. Since Sutherland's "differential association theory" (1947), it has been recognised that crime can be socially learned. This theory holds that a person becomes delinquent when definitions favourable to law violation outweigh those unfavourable to, and these definitions are acquired through social interactions (Sutherland 1947: 6). Thus, the propensity for criminal conduct increases with more frequent, lasting, and intense interactions with individuals or groups who exhibit behavioural patterns, verbalise, or rationalise such criminal conduct.

The "Jogo Duplo" suggests that the manipulated players' decision to engage in match-fixing cannot be dissociated from the differential association established between them and their peers. First, to guarantee access to the locker room of the manipulated clubs, the "Luso-Malaysian" group used gatekeepers (see Cima 2024). They took on the dual role of active and passive corruptor, interacting directly, durably and frequently with teammates and expressing attitudes, values and norms in favour of match-fixing, particularly by rationalising match-fixing as an acceptable behaviour in matches with no competitive interest.

(Message exchange between C10 and J2).

- If you lose against [team name] it's beginning to get more difficult. If it starts to get too difficult, manage it [start to fix matches] (C10).

He even told me to not worry with my underperformance, that my team didn´t have anything to win, but I did not want to know […] (PP2).

Organisational culture

In recent years FIFA and UEFA have seen their reputations affected by allegations of fraud and corruption (see Geeraert 2018; Jennings 2006), and their limited commitment to changing what Bures (2008) describes as an opaque and familiar culture.

The reluctance to change unethical or corrupt organisational cultures creates opportunities for the emergence and perpetuation of deviant behaviours within organisations (Brass, Butterfield & Skaggs, 1998). Since the activities of an organisation's employees are guided by norms that emanate from its organisational culture (Ashford et al., 2008), and since national federations are under the aegis of these international bodies, it is to be expected that the consequences of the presence of these cultural elements (loss of trust in organisations, lack of legitimacy of institutional discourse) will extend throughout the sports system. As a result, illegal or unethical behaviours can become rationalised, tolerated or even necessary in certain circumstances (Ashford et al., 2008; Treviño & Youngblood, 1990), even on the part of the sports players at the base of the sports system (e.g. players, referees).

Research in Portuguese sport shows that, despite the educational programs and the legal and disciplinary reforms undertaken, professional football players continue to bet on the matches and competitions in which they participate. Players disagree with the normative discourse of legal institutions and sports organisations, which establishes a link between such behaviour and match-fixing (Moriconi and Cima 2020a). Players are also more reluctant to report cases of match-fixing (Moriconi and Cima 2020b). As observed in other countries (see FIFPro, 2012; Manoli and Antonopoulos 2015), in Portugal this reluctance is explained by the fear of reprisals not so much those inflicted by criminal groups, but rather those that are imposed by sports leaders themselves (Moriconi and Cima 2020a). Moreover, the "zero-tolerance" policy implemented by UEFA and fully transposed by the FPF has been more effective in allocating responsibility to individual players than in eradicating the structures of opportunity that are at the root of the phenomenon (Cima & Moriconi, 2022, 2023). As already mentioned, many of the strains experienced by national footballer's stem from historical problems in Portuguese professional football (wage default, unregulated investment, etc.), which in turn help to rationalised narratives in favour of match-fixing in certain circumstances.

Opportunity structures

The relationship between strain and match-fixing is also explained by situational factors that constitute opportunities for crime (Clarke 2009; Cohen and Felson 1979; Cornish and Clarke 1986). According to routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson's, 1979) crime increases when motivated offenders, suitable targets, and absence of capable guardianship converged. Match-fixing is paradigmatic at this level. Firstly, the reconfiguration of sports betting market has stimulated interest in setting up criminal match-fixing networks, increasing the number of "motivated offenders" (see, for example, Forrest et al. 2008; Gorse & Chadwick, 2010; Moriconi and Almeida 2021). The strains analysed previously, show how a set of problems in the sporting and political systems have "created" "suitable targets". The "absence of guardianship'' stems from the lack of political will to combat (sports) corruption in Portugal (Cima 2023).

In this respect, Portugal has taken an eminently reactive stance in combating sports corruption. Although several European countries were affected by match-fixing cases before (e.g.: Germany, Italy, Belgium, Greece), in Portugal reforms to corruption legislation only followed the "Jogo Duplo" case and a proposed law presented by the FPF (Moriconi and Almeida 2019). Law enforcement bodies also lack human, technological and financial resources to apply the law in a timely manner (Cima 2023). Although the "Jogo Duplo" case dates to the 2015–2016 season, the judgment of the trial was only read on 28 February 2020. What's more, at the time of writing this article (a decade after the case was triggered) the case has still not reached a final judgement. If the FPF had not imposed sporting sanctions on the footballers involved, there would have been a risk that they would still be competing. However, the non-application of criminal sanctions (namely prison sentences) has enabled some of those involved (e.g. J5) to pursue their careers abroad.

Portugal has also been largely un proactive in developing prevention and enforcement mechanisms (Cima 2023). Although it was one of the first three countries to ratify the Macolin Convention, Portugal only implemented its National Platform in 2024. The National Platform is considered the pillar of the Macolin Convention and is a mechanism for exchanging information that promotes national and international cooperation in criminal investigations and prosecutions in the context of the manipulation of sports competitions (Council of Europe 2014). Furthermore, Malta´s blocking delayed the accession of other states to the Convention (Büchel 2020; Serby 2015), undermining national and international coordination, particularly when criminal investigations involve requests for letters rogatory to carry out proceedings in Asian countries, as was the case with the 'Luso-Malaysian' group.

Finally, Cornish & Clarke's (1986) rational choice perspective helps explain how the new sports betting model has altered the structure of financial incentives in sports, creating scenarios in which the deliberate reduction of sporting performance can be more advantageous than sporting merit (Tak 2018). In "Jogo Duplo" access to inside information allowed some players to obtain an income supplemental to the bribe through betting gains (Cima 2024), while political and sporting climate has proved ineffective in increasing the costs and risks associated with this crime.

Conclusions

The aim of this study was to understand why some professional footballers playing in Portugal get involved in match-fixing practices based on a *quid pro quo*. It was found that the decision making of this social group is closely linked to the experience of three types of strain: financial problems, lack of prospects, and reality shock. If, on the one hand, strains increase the vulnerability of footballers, exposing them to a greater degree to manipulative approaches, on the other hand, their impact on footballers' criminal behaviour is enhanced by a set of relational (social approval from peers), organisational (cultural incentives from the sports system) and structural (structural incentives from the political system) catalysts. These catalysts promote definitions favourable to match-fixing, contribute to the perpetuation and normalisation of deviant behaviours in sports, and broaden the field of opportunities for the manifestation of this phenomenon.

This article has advanced the understanding of match-fixing in several ways. First, this research shows that match-fixing in Portuguese professional football can be configured as an alternative (illegitimate) solution to mitigate financial problems, rather than as an illegitimate means of achieving financial success, as suggested by other authors (see, for example, Hill 2015; Lastra et al. 2018). The evidence also expands on Hill (2015) work by demonstrating that the lack of prospects does not only generate strains in footballers at the end of their careers. Footballers in the early or middle stages of their careers - particularly when they play in a football landscape characterised by precariousness - can also resort to match-fixing as an illegitimate means of achieving positively valued goals. This research expands the relationship between strains and match-fixing to a wider range of negative experiences, by explaining how the experience of criminal victimisation can culminate in involvement in match-fix-

ing practices. Finally, it presents how scenarios neglected by the literature, such as abrupt career decline or career stagnation in lower divisions, can induce footballers to engage in match-fixing practices when the achievements are not in line with previously created expectations.

One of the main contributions to the literature is the production of micro-level knowledge without neglecting the intermediate social influences and the structural possibilities and constraints underlying match-fixing practices. The results reinforce that match-fixing cannot be reduced to a problem of individual ethical failure (see Marchetti et al. 2021; Tak 2018; Tak et al. 2018a, b; Cima & Moriconi, 2022; 2023) and it enriches the literature by explaining - based on a concrete case - how the individual dimension of match-fixing is influenced by its organisational and structural dimensions.

First, the strains experienced by national professional footballers result from sporting and political failures. Financial problems stem from the inability of sports organisations to solve non-compliance with salary payments (see Cima & Moriconi, 2022; 2023); illegal immigration or human trafficking result from a legal framework ineffective in preventing unregulated investment (Cima 2025); and the lack of prospects is closely linked to the non-inclusion of Portuguese footballers in the status of high-performance athletes (ibid.)[7].

Secondly, the factors that boost the impact of strains derive from organisational and structural omissions. The lack of political will to combat sporting corruption in Portugal, and the reluctance of international sporting bodies to reform an opaque and familiar organisational culture, creates conditions that facilitate match-fixing. This happens when: (1) states fail to implement policies, regulations and procedures that crack down on behaviours likely to affect the fairness of sports competitions (Aquilina and Chetcuti 2013; Holden and Rodenberg 2017); regulations that establish desirable behaviours, such as reporting cases of sports corruption (see Moriconi and Cima 2020b); and prevention, monitoring and prosecution mechanisms, such as the National Platform (see Moriconi and Almeida 2019; Büchel 2020); and (2) international football bodies do not provide guidance to national federations, leagues and clubs, contributing to the legitimisation and normalisation of deviant behaviours in the sports system (see Tak 2018; Tak et al., 2018a).

Thirdly, the results highlight that peer approval plays a decisive role in the acceptance of match-fixing (Barkoukis et al. 2020; der Hoeven et al. 2020; O'Shea et al., 2021; der Hoeven et al., 2024). However, the effectiveness of these influences depends on flaws in the sports system (e.g. obsolete competitive models). In particular, the lack of sporting objectives represents a key element in shaping narratives in favour of match-fixing among players who play for teams relegated at an early stage of the competition.

This article also contributes to the development of the GST. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to extend the explanatory potential of GST to cor-

[7] As they do not have the status of high-performance athletes, national footballers are unable to benefit from the "specific support measures for the development of high-performance sport" provided for in Decree-Law 272/2009 of October 1, which include easier entry into higher education, transfer to a new school, scholarships, the appointment of an accompanying teacher or the justification of absences.

ruption offences in sport. Furthermore, this research presents a new set of strains, such as the career stagnation, the abrupt decline in career, and immigration-related victimisation", which have been under-theorized in literature. This research also shows all strains find their genesis in the perpetuation of a set of "bad practices" and/or structural problems (e.g. wage arrears, deregulated investment). This evidence reinforces the criticism of the individualist character of GST (see, for example, Lilly, Cullen & Ball, 2019), demonstrating that individual experiences that lead to strains need to be understood in the light of meso- and macro-factors that create opportunities for crime.

These conclusions have strong political and sporting implications. Public policies and sporting measures to combat match-fixing are unlikely to succeed if the organisational and structural gaps underlying the strains remain unaddressed. This is not to say that all footballers who engage in match-fixing do so because they face strains. However, if the underlying reasons for committing the offence exist, crime will probably continue to occur (Clarke 1995; Cornish and Clarke 2003; Wilcox and Cullen 2018). Furthermore, educational tools aimed at reducing the social approval of match-fixing may be ineffective if sports organisations fail to address risk factors that support narratives in favour of match-fixing practices in certain situations (e.g. obsolete competitive models and games without competitive interest).

Given the proliferation of match-fixing cases in international football (see Cima 2024; Costa 2018; FIFPro 2012; Manoli and Antonopoulos 2015; Marchetti et al. 2021; Marchetti et al. 2023), sports corruption is a pervasive problem. Klitgaard (2006) argues that when corruption becomes embedded in an industry, solutions require cooperation networks among all stakeholders. Although the Council of Europe has raised political awareness of match-fixing, it has been ineffective due to some states´ unwillingness to ratify the Convention, and poor capacity and lack of political will from the internal structures of these states to effectively implement their provisions (see Büchel 2020). Furthermore, FIFA and UEFA´s claims to self-regulation further constrain the ability of states to regulate and supervise football. In this context, effective oversight could require an external body capable of investigating and sanctioning, as well as facilitating international cooperation (see, for example, Chappelet 2018; Hartmann 2023; Kruessmann 2019).

This research also has some limitations. The impossibility of gathering input from the actors involved in match-fixing prevented an understand of how strains are perceived by players and how relational, organisational and structural factors contributed to their criminal conduct. Future research using socio-psychological perspectives could explore this question. Moreover, more studies are needed to explore the link between match-fixing and human trafficking or illegal immigration, particularly through life stories that exemplify the social impact of such victimisation. Finally, although the focus of this research is not on generalisation, the three types of strains identified are broad enough to apply to other international football cases. For example, Croatian player Mario Čižmek exemplifies how persistent wage default (in this case, 14 months of unpaid wages) can motivate footballers to engage in match-fixing to solve financial problems (Play the Game, n.a.). The case of English player Moses Swaibu shows the impact that an abrupt career decline can have on a young man who has placed his hopes in football to transcend his social conditions, based

on the cultural aspirations and expectations placed on him at the start of his career (Swaibu 2025). Finally, the case of Democratic Republic of Congo´s professional players, highlights the risks that even intracontinental migration can represent for the careers and lives of athletes in vulnerable conditions, let alone an intercontinental migration (FIFPro 2023).

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